Ukraine’s Air Force Selects Gripen Fighters Amid Transition Challenges

Ukraine’s Air Force has officially chosen to acquire between 120 and 150 Saab JAS-39E Gripen fighters, a decision that has generated considerable attention and some surprise. This announcement comes just a month after Sweden’s Defense Minister indicated that any agreement would take a significant amount of time to finalize. Although the deal has sparked enthusiasm, it will take several years before these advanced aircraft are operational over Ukrainian skies.

Several questions arise from this pivotal decision. The Ukrainian Air Force (PSU) is currently utilizing older French and US jets, so why has it opted for the Gripen? What specific advantages does this aircraft offer that align with Ukraine’s defense needs? Additionally, potential challenges in integrating the Gripen into the existing fleet cannot be ignored.

The PSU has substantial experience operating western-designed fighters, though these include older models like the F-16 and Mirage 2000, which were developed during the Cold War. These aircraft lack modern technological features, such as an Active Electronically-Scanning Array (AESA) radar. The Gripen, in contrast, is equipped with a state-of-the-art digital infrastructure that enhances its capabilities in contested air combat environments, supported by advanced weapon systems.

Integrating the Gripen presents unique challenges. According to a Ukrainian defense enterprise executive, while the older F-16s and Mirages are familiar to many personnel, the Gripen represents a completely new operational paradigm. “The Gripen E is obviously a marvel of a machine,” the executive stated, emphasizing that the PSU will need to learn how to maximize its potential in combat. This transition is expected to significantly enhance Ukraine’s air power projection.

Understanding the Gripen’s Role in Ukraine’s Air Strategy

To grasp why the Gripen may be a suitable choice for Ukraine, it is essential to analyze the air conflict since Russia’s invasion in February 2022. Initially, the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) aimed to execute a Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) mission to facilitate a surprise assault on Kyiv. However, the VKS quickly struggled against Ukraine’s air defenses, suffering substantial losses that forced a strategic pullback by early March 2022. As Ukrainian ground-based air defense units regrouped, the effectiveness of the VKS declined.

Former SHAPE Commander Philip Breedlove highlighted at the October 2022 Warsaw Security Forum that the Russian air campaign was hampered by organizational deficiencies and inadequate training. “We had assumed Russia still had the skill to perform the SEAD mission,” he noted, emphasizing that this capability appears to have diminished over time. Instead, the VKS has resorted to targeting civilian infrastructure, while air-to-air engagements remain infrequent.

In response, the PSU has relied on dispersed basing operations, a tactic rooted in Soviet military doctrine. This approach allows aircraft to be launched and recovered from highways and unimproved airstrips, making them less vulnerable to Russian attacks. Ukrainian pilots have trained extensively for this agile strategy, ensuring their readiness for rapid deployment across various airfields in western Ukraine.

The Gripen’s Advantages and Integration Challenges

The Gripen’s design aligns well with these operational needs. Unlike other fighters, the Gripen is specifically engineered for dispersed operations, making it a natural fit for the PSU. Furthermore, it boasts a high availability rate of reportedly 85 percent or better when supported adequately. Cost considerations also favor the Gripen; it is less expensive to procure and maintain compared to larger fighters like the Eurofighter or Rafale.

Sweden has promised that the first Gripen aircraft for Ukraine will be delivered within a three-year timeframe, which is a quicker timeline than that of competing options. This speed is crucial for the Ukrainian military as it seeks to bolster its air capabilities in the ongoing conflict.

Another aspect of the Gripen that may have appealed to Ukraine is its advanced electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. The Gripen E includes sophisticated systems designed for electronic warfare, which have become increasingly important in the current operational landscape. These features can obscure the aircraft’s presence from enemy radar, complicating targeting efforts.

Despite these advantages, the Gripen’s advanced systems will necessitate a shift in training and operational tactics for Ukrainian pilots. The transition to new EW systems and AESA radar will require a comprehensive training regime. Fortunately, the PSU has already begun pilot training on the Gripen, which may expedite familiarization once the aircraft arrives.

Moreover, the introduction of the Gripen will allow the PSU to adopt more offensive tactics, shifting from a primarily defensive posture with older aircraft. This transition may involve closer engagement with Russian air defenses, presenting both opportunities and risks.

While the three-year gap before the Gripen becomes operational provides time for thorough preparation, it also highlights the urgency for Ukraine’s air capabilities to evolve. The Gripen’s entry into service promises a significant enhancement to Ukraine’s air power, potentially transforming the dynamics of the ongoing conflict.

As Ukraine prepares for this critical addition to its military arsenal, the implications of this decision will unfold in the coming years. The successful integration of the Gripen could represent a new chapter in Ukraine’s defense strategy, enhancing both its operational capabilities and its deterrence against ongoing threats.